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TAXATION
Craig D. Bell *
Emily J.S. Winbigler **
INTRODUCTION
This article reviews significant recent developments in the laws
affecting Virginia state and local taxation. Each section covers
legislative activity, judicial decisions, and selected opinions or
pronouncements from the Virginia Tax Department (the "Tax
Department") and the Virginia Attorney General over the past
year.
Part I of this article addresses tate taxes. Part II of this article
covers local taxes, including real and tangible personal property,
license taxes, recordation tax, and administrative local tax proce-
dures.
The overall purpose of this article is to provide Virginia tax and
general practitioners with a concise overview of the recent devel-
opments in Virginia taxation that will most likely impact them.
However, this article does not discuss many of the numerous
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technical legislative changes to Title 58.1 of the Virginia Code,
which covers taxation.
I. TAXES ADMINISTERED BY THE VIRGINIA TAX DEPARTMENT
A. Significant Legislative Activity
1. Fixed Date of Conformity
The 2017 Virginia General Assembly amended Virginia Code
section 58.1-301, which mandates conformity with the terms of
the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"), to advance Virginia's fixed
date of conformity from December 31, 2015, to December 31,
2016.1 This advancement allows Virginia to conform to the federal
United States Appreciation for Olympians and Paralympians Act
of 2016,2 as well as other federal tax legislation enacted during
2016.
As in prior yearsi there are federal tax provisions that are dis-
allowed in Virginia, including the special bonus depreciation al-
lowance for certain property provided for under IRC sections
168(k), 168(1), 168(m), 1400L, and 1400N,3 as well as the five-year
carryback period for certain net operating losses under IRC sec-
tion 172(b)(1)(H).4 Virginia tax law also continues to disallow the
income tax deductions related to applicable high-yield discount
obligations under IRC section 163(e)(5)(F)5 and the deferral of
certain incorhe from the debt cancellation under IRC section
108(i), unless the taxpayer elects to include such income ratably
over a three-year period beginning with tax year 2009 for trans-
actions completed in tax year 2009, or over a three-year period
1. Act of Feb 3, 2017, ch. 1, 2011 Va. Acts -, _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-301 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
2. United States Appreciation for Olympians and Paralympians Act of 2016, Pub. L.
No. 114-239, 130 Stat. 973 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 74(d)). This legislation excludes
from gross income the value of any medal awarded or any prize money received from the
United States Olympic Committee for competition in the Olympic Games or Paralympic
Games. Id. at 973. This income tax exclusion does not apply to an individual if his or her
adjusted gross income exceeds $1 million, or $500,000 if such individual is married and
filing a separate income tax return. Id.
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-301(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
4. Id. § 58.1-301(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
5. Id. § 58.1-301(B)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
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beginning with tax year 2010 for transactions completed in tax
year 2010 on or before April 21, 2010.6
2. Subtraction for Virginia Venture Capital Account Created
The Virginia legislature amended Virginia Code sections 58.1-
322 and 58.1-402 to create a subtraction for the individual and
corporate income tax, respectively, for certain investments in a
Virginia venture capital account made on or after January 1,
2018, but before December 31, 2023.7 Income eligible for this sub-
traction includes investment partnership carried interest.8 An in-
vestment fund must register with the Tax Department and re-
quest certification as a Virginia venture capital account.9 In order
to be certified, the registration statement must include a fund's
intent to invest at least fifty percent of the capital committed in
qualified portfolio companies (the "investment test") and "docu-
mentation that it employs at least one investor who has at least
four years of professional experience in venture capital invest-
ment or substantially equivalent experience" (the "employment
test").10
A qualified portfolio company is a company that has its princi-
pal place of business in Virginia; has a primary purpose of pro-
duction, sale, research, or development of a product or service;
and provides equity in exchange for the investment." If the Tax
Department determines that an investment fund meets the em-
ployment test, it must certify the fund as a Virginia venture capi-
tal account at such time as the investment fund actually meets
the investment test.12 No subtraction is allowed for an investment
in a company that is owned or operated by an affiliate of the tax-
payer.13 In addition, no subtraction is allowed for an individual
6. Id. § 58.1-301(B)(4) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
7. Act of Mar. 24, 2017, ch. 762, 2017 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-322.02(27)(a), -402(C)(25)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
8. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-322.02(27)(a), -402(25)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
9. Id. §§ 58.1-322.02(27)(b), -402(C)(25)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
10. Id. § 58.1-322.02(27)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2017) '"Substantially equivalent experience'
includes, but is not limited to, an undergraduate degree from an accredited college or uni-
versity in economics, finance, or a similar field of study." Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. §§ 58.1-322.02(27)(a), -402(C)(25)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2017). This prohibition also ex-
tends to family members when the taxpayer is an individual, under section 58.1-
322.02(27)(a). Id. § 58.1-322.02(27)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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taxpayer who claims, with respect to the same investment, a sub-
traction for long-term capital gain or investment partnership car-
ried interest pursuant to Virginia Code section 58.1-322(24) or a
credit for subordinated debt investments pursuant to Virginia
Code section 58.1-339.4.14 A corporate taxpayer may not claim
this subtraction if, with respect to the same investment, it claims
a subtraction for long-term capital gain or investment partner-
ship carried interest income pursuant to Virginia Code section
58.1-402(24).15
The legislation requires the Tax Department to publish regula-
tions, prior to December 31, 2017, in accordance with the Admin-
istrative Process Act, establishing procedures regarding the (i)
registration of an investment fund as a Virginia venture capital
account, (ii) documentation satisfying the requirements of the ed-
ucation test, and (iii) certification of an investment fund as a Vir-
ginia venture capital account.16
3. Expansion of Qualifying Expenditures for Enterprise Zone
Real Property Investment Grants and Enterprise Zone Real
Property Investment Tax Credits
The Virginia legislature amended Virginia Code sections 59.1-
280.1 and 59.1-548 to allow otherwise qualifying expenditures to
qualify for Enterprise Zone Real Property Investment Grants and
Enterprise Zone Real Property Investment Tax Credits, regard-
less of whether such expenditures are considered properly
chargeable to a capital account or deductible as business expenses
under federal Treasury Regulations.17
4. Extension of Sunset Dates for Certain Tax Credits
The Virginia legislature amended Virginia Code sections 58.1-
439.6 and 58.1-439.12:07 to extend (i) the sunset date for the
14. Id. § 58.1-322.02(27)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
15. Id. § 58.1-322(C)(25)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2017); see Craig D. Bell, Annual Survey of Vir-
ginia Law: Taxation, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 377, 382 (2010); see also Craig D. Bell, Annual
Survey of Virginia Law: Taxation, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 307, 314 (2012).
16. Act of Mar. 24, 2017, ch. 762, 2017 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended, in part, at
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-322, -402 (Repl. Vol. 2017)). Section 2 of this Act requires the Tax
Department to promulgate regulations, but that requirement is not codified in Title 58.1 of
the Virginia Code. Id.
17. Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 451, 2017 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 59.1-280.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2017)).
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worker retraining tax credit from taxable years beginning before
January 1, 2018, to taxable years beginning before January 1,
2022, (ii) the sunset date for the telework expenses tax credit
from taxable years beginning before January 1, 2017, to taxable
years beginning before January 1, 2022, and (iii) the date before
which an employer must enter into a telework agreement with a
participating employee to January 1, 2022.18
The Virginia legislature also amended Virginia Code section
58.1-439.12:03 to extend the expiration date of the Motion Picture
Production Credit from January 1, 2019, to January 1, 2022.19
5. Clarification that Storage of Inventory Creates Nexus for
Sales Tax Purposes
Legislation adopted by the Virginia General Assembly amends
Virginia Code section 58.1-612 to clarify that the presence of an
out-of-state dealer's inventory within Virginia is sufficient con-
tact, giving rise to nexus with Virginia. 20 In order for Virginia to
require an out-of-state dealer to register to collect and remit Vir-
ginia retail sales and use tax on its sales to Virginia residents,
the dealer must have the requisite connection, or nexus, with
Virginia.21 The Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court of the United States, control a nexus determination.22 As
interpreted by the Supreme Court, a nexus for sales tax purposes
is created only when substantial physical presence is estab-
lished.23 Virginia Code section 58.1-612 sets out the activities of a
dealer that gives rise to a nexus and thus requires an out-of-state
18. Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 454, 2017 Va. Acts _, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.6, -439.12:07 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
19. Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 425, 2017 Va. Acts _, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.12:03 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
20. Act of Mar. 5, 2017, ch. 808, 2017 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-612 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
21. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
22. The Commerce Clause reserves to Congress the power to regulate commerce
among the states and with foreign nations and generally requires a substantial presence
in a taxing state by the entity the state desires to tax. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Mil-
ler Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 342-43 (1953) (stating that "[i]f there is some ju-
risdictional fact or event," there may be a substantial presence sufficient o extend the
State's taxing powers beyond state lines). The Due Process Clause requires a definite link
or minimum connection between the state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks
to tax. Miller Bros. Co., 347 U.S. at 344-45.
23. Miller Bros. Co., 347 U.S. at 345.
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dealer to collect Virginia Retail Sales and Use Tax.24 Under prior
law, it was unclear whether storage of inventory within Virginia
created a nexus. The new legislation makes clear that remote
sellers who sell to Virginia customers' inventory stored at Virgin-
ia fulfillment centers and warehouses owned by unrelated third
parties must register as dealers for Virginia sales tax collection
purposes.
6. Retailers that Install Certain Fixtures Treated as Consuming
Contractors
The Virginia legislature amended Virginia Code section 58.1-
610 to repeal the exception for retailers that sell and install cer-
tain specified fixtures to be treated as retailers with respect to
those sales instead of as consuming contractors.25 Under Virginia
law, sellers and installers of tangible personal property that be-
comes real property after installation are treated as contractors
and are required to pay sales tax on their purchase or use of the
property they install.26 Under prior law, there was an exception
for dealers who both sell and install "fences, venetian blinds,
window shades, awnings, storm windows and doors, locks and
locking devices, floor coverings... , cabinets, countertops, kitchen
equipment, window air conditioning units or other like or compa-
rable items."2 7 This exception permitted those dealers to treat the
sales of these items of tangible personal property as retail sales
and to collect sales tax from their customers on such sales.28 The
Virginia legislature repealed this exception and, accordingly,
dealers who sell at retail, but also sell and offer installation of
fences, venetian blinds, window shades, awnings, storm windows
and doors, locks and locking devices, floor coverings, cabinets,
countertops, kitchqn equipment, window air conditioning units, or
other like or comparable items are treated as consuming contrac-
tors for the purposes of the retail sales and use tax.2 9
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-612 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
25. Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 449, 2017 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-610 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-610 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
27. Id. § 58.1-610(D) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
28. See id.
29. See ch. 449, 2017 Va. Acts ,_.
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7. New Exemption for Aviation Parts
The Virginia legislature amended Virginia Code sections 58.1-
609.3 and 58.1-609.10 to provide an exemption from the sales and
use tax for parts, engines, and supplies used for maintaining, re-
pairing, or reconditioning aircrafts or any aircraft's avionics sys-
tem, engine, or component parts.30 The exemption will apply to
both manned and unmanned systems, but will not cover tools or
equipment not attached to the aircraft.31 Under current law, tan-
gible personal property (including tools or equipment)
sold or leased to an airline operating in intrastate, interstate or for-
eign commerce as a common carrier providing scheduled air service
on a continuing basis to one or more Virginia airports at least one
day per week, for use or consumption by such airline directly in the
rendition of its common carrier service
is exempt from sales and use tax.3 2 The new legislation will cover
unscheduled common carriers and owners of private aircrafts and
drones that are not covered by the current exemption. This legis-
lation will become effective on July 1, 2018, and expire on July 1,
2022.33
8. Automotive Repair Supplies Taxable to Purchaser
The Virginia General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-602 to require automobile repair businesses to charge and
collect sales tax from their customers on separately stated charg-
es for supplies used during the repairs, whether or not title or
possession of the supplies passes to the customer.34 Under current
law, the repair business pays sales tax on supplies it uses and
consumes in its business at the time of purchase; thus, separately
stated charges on a customer's invoice for supplies used during
the repair of the automobile are not subject to the tax.3 5 The new
legislation permits automobile repairers to purchase such sup-
30. Act of Mar. 24, 2017, ch. 714, 2017 V4. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.10 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
31. Id.
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.3(6) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
33. Ch. 714, 2017 Va. Acts _, _.
34. Act of Feb. 21, 2017, ch. 104, 2017 Va. Acts , (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-602 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-602 (Repl. Vol. 2017) (providing the definition of "retail
sale").
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plies exempt from the tax as sales for resale, but they must collect
sales tax from their customers on separately stated charges for
supplies.
9. Online Disclosure of Registration Information
The Virginia legislature enacted Virginia Code section 58.1-
623.01 to require the Tax Department to provide online access by
registered dealers to the names and registration numbers of deal-
ers who are currently registered for the retail sales and use tax.36
The Tax Department has already been authorized to disclose this
information,37 but it would only disclose this information by tele-
phone.38 Providing registered dealers with online access to the
names and registration numbers of other dealers may facilitate
dealers' efforts to validate the legitimacy of resale exemption cer-
tificates and perhaps reduce the opportunity for individuals to
fabricate dealer resale exemption certificates with invalid dealer
registration numbers.39
10. Extensions of Certain Sales Tax Exemptions: Advertising
Businesses, Sales Tax Holidays, Audiovisual Productions and
Equipment, and Educational Materials
The Virginia legislature amended Virginia Code section 58.1-
609.6 to extend the sunset date for the exemption allowed for the
purchase of printed materials by advertising businesses located
in Virginia when the printed material is distributed outside of
Virginia.40 The exemption was scheduled to expire July 1, 2017,
but is now extended to July 1, 2022.41
The Virginia legislature also extended by five years the sunset
date from July 1, 2017, to July 1, 2022, for the combined sales tax
holidays for school supplies and clothing.42 The Virginia legisla-
36. Act of Feb. 20, 2017, ch. 49, 2017 Va. Acts , _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-623.01 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
38. VA. DEP'T OF TAXATION, 2017 FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT: HB 1810 (2017).
39. Id.
40. Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 441, 2017 Va. Acts _, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.6 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
41. Id.
42. Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 446, 2017 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE. ANN. § 58.1-611.2 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
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ture also extended the sunset date for qualifying Energy Star and
WaterSense products,43 and hurricane preparedness products to
July 1, 2022.44
The Virginia legislature also extended to July 1, 2022, the sun-
set date for the exemption for certain audio and video works in
Virginia Code section 58.1-609.6.45 The Virginia legislature also
extended the sunset date to July 1, 2022, for the exemption in
Virginia Code section 58.1-609.6 for textbooks and other educa-
tional materials withdrawn from inventory at book-publishing
distribution facilities when such materials are withdrawn for free
distribution to professors and other individuals with an educa-
tional focus. 4 6
11. Exemption for Legal Tender Coins
In 2015, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-609.1 to exempt from sales tax the sale of gold, silver, and
platinum bullion where the sales price for the transaction exceeds
$1000.47 However, coins not meeting the definition of gold, silver,
and platinum bullion in Virginia Code section 58.1-609.1(19) re-
mained subject to sales and use tax. In the 2017 session of the
General Assembly, the legislature amended Virginia Code section
58.1-609.1 to create a new exemption for the sale of legal tender
coins where the sales price for the transaction exceeds $1000.48
The definition of "legal tender coins" includes "coins of any metal
content issued by a government as a medium of exchange or
payment of debts."49 The exemption for sales of legal tender coins
becomes effective on January 1, 2018.50 The exemptions for gold,
43. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE. ANN. § 58.1-609.1(18) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
44. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE. ANN. § 58.1-611.3 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
45. Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 412, 2017 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.6(6) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
46. Act of Feb. 20, 2017, ch. 54, 2017 Va. Acts -, _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-609.6(7) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
47. Act of Mar. 26, 2015, ch. 620, 2015 Va. Acts , (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.1(19) (Repl. Vol. 2017)); see William L.S. Rowe & Emily J.S. Win-
bigler, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Taxation, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 177, 181 (2015).
48. Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch 445, 2017 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.1(19) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
49. VA. CODE. ANN. § 58.1-609.1(19) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
50. Id.
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silver, and platinum bullion, as well as legal tender coins, expire
on June 30, 2022.51
12. Tax Amnesty Program
The legislature enacted Virginia Code section 58.1-1840.2 to
authorize the Tax Commissioner to oversee the Virginia Tax Am-
nesty Program during a period of time ranging between sixty and
seventy-five days from July 1, 2017, to June 30, 2018.52 This pro-
gram would apply to any taxpayer who is required to file a return
or to pay any tax administered by the Tax Department, but has
failed to do so.53 All civil or criminal penalties assessed or assess-
able and one-half of the interest assessed or assessable, resulting
from nonpayment, underpayment, nonreporting, or underreport-
ing of tax liabilities, will be waived upon payment of the taxes
and interest.54 At the conclusion of the amnesty period, any re-
maining amnesty-qualified liabilities would be assessed an addi-
tional twenty percent penalty.55
B. New Filing Fees
The Virginia legislature imposed new filing fees for each re-
quest for an offer in compromise with respect to doubtful collecta-
bility under Virginia Code section 58.1-105 ($50), a letter ruling
under Virginia Code section 58.1-203 ($275), a local business tax
advisory opinion under Virginia Code sections 58.1-3701 or 58.1-
3983.1 ($275), and a corporate income tax filing status change re-
quest under Virginia Code section 58.1-442 ($100).56 The fee must
be paid contemporaneously with the request.57 The Department of
Taxation may grant waivers "if the Tax Commissioner finds that
51. Id.
52. Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch 433, 2017 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-1840.2 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
53. VA. CODE. ANN. § 58.1-1840.2 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Act of Apr. 28, 2017, ch. 836, item 275V, 2017 Va. Acts __.
57. VA. DEP'T OF TAXATION, TAX BULLETIN 17-5: IMPORTANT INFORMATION REGARDING





such fee creates an unreasonable burden on the person making
the request."58
II. TAXES ADMINISTERED BY LOCALITIES
A. Significant Legislative Activity
1. Business License Taxes
The legislature has required the Tax Department to promul-
gate regulations that clarify the appropriate methodology for de-
termining deductible gross receipts attributable to business con-
ducted in another state or foreign country in which the taxpayer
(or its shareholders, partners, or members, in lieu of the taxpay-
er) is liable for an income or other tax based upon income.59 "The
regulations shall be based on previous Rulings of the Tax Com-
missioner . . . and the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia
in The Nielsen Company, LLC v. County Board of Arlington
County, 289 Va. 79 (2015)."6o There is no deadline for the Tax De-
partment to publish these regulations.
2. Recordation Taxes: Reinsertion of Exemption for Deeds of
Trust or Mortgages Given by Utility Consumer Services
Cooperatives or Utility Aggregation Cooperatives
The legislature amended Virginia Code section 58.1-811 to re-
insert an exemption from the recordation tax for deeds of trust or
mortgages given by utility consumer services cooperatives or util-
ity aggregation cooperatives.61 This exemption was erroneously
deleted from the Virginia Code in 1994, but the exemption has
generally continued to be granted since that time.62 Because most
of the borrowing by these cooperatives is with federal instrumen-
talities, the cooperatives have generally been claiming that their
deeds of trust are exempt from the recordation tax as deeds con-
veying property to the United States.63
58. Id.
59. Act of Feb. 20, 2017, ch. 50, 2017 Va. Acts_., .
60. Id.
61. Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 442, 2017 Va. Acts , (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-811 (Repl. Vol. 2017)); VA. CODE ANN. § 56-231.15 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
62. VA. DEP'T OF TAxATION, 2017 FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT: SB 875 (Feb. 21, 2017).
63. Id.
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3. Pilot Program Authorized for the City of Danville
The Virginia legislature authorized the City of Danville, after a
public hearing, to enact an ordinance authorizing "a pilot project
regarding recordation of deeds subject to liens for unpaid taxes."64
Pursuant o this program, the clerk could record certain deeds on-
ly if the city director of finance certifies "that there are no liens
against [the] property for unpaid local taxes or for other fines or
charges assessed by the city." 65 Any deed with an assessed value
of $50,000 or less falls within the ambit of this program.66 The pi-
lot program may not apply to deeds of trust, deeds of easement,
deeds in which a public service company, railroad, or cable sys-
tem operator is either a grantor or grantee, deeds prepared under
the supervision of the Office of the Attorney General, deeds con-
veying property to the Danville Redevelopment and Housing Au-
thority, or deeds conveying real property to satisfy liens or delin-
quent taxes.67 This pilot program was enacted at the
recommendation of the Virginia Housing Commission, and, if en-
acted by the City of Danville as contemplated, it is expected to aid
in the City's collection of delinquent taxes.68
4. Real and Tangible Personal Property
a. Creation of Green Development Zones
The legislature enacted a new statute, Virginia Code section
58.1-3854, and amended Virginia Code section 58.1-3245.12 to
authorize local governing bodies to create, by ordinance, one or
more green development zones.69 Localities are permitted to
"grant tax incentives and provide certain regulatory flexibility"
inside these zones for a maximum period of ten years to green de-
velopment businesses and businesses operating in energy-
efficient buildings.70 A "green development business" is "a busi-




68. VA. DEP'T OF TAXATION, 2017 FIscAL IMPACT STATEMENT: HB 1699 (Feb. 16,
2017).
69. Act of Feb. 17, 2017, ch. 27, 2017 Va. Acts , (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 58.1-3245.12, -3854(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3854(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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ness engaged primarily in the design, development, or production
of materials, components, or equipment used to reduce negative
impact on the environment."71
The legislature also authorized local governing bodies to adopt
a local enterprise zone development taxation program for the
green development zone, regardless of whether the green devel-
opment zone has been designated by the governor as an enter-
prise zone, and would make the laws that apply to enterprise
zones also applicable to green development zones.72
b. Nonjudicial Sales of Delinquent Property
The legislature made several amendments to Virginia Code
section 58.1-3975 concerning nonjudicial sales of tax delinquent
real properties valued at less than $20,000.73 Nonjudicial sales of
improved or unimproved properties valued between $5000 and
$20,000, where the taxes are delinquent for more than three
years, are permitted provided an additional requirement is met.74
These requirements include that the property (i) is unimproved
and measures less than 4000 square feet, (ii) is unimproved and
has been determined to be unsuitable for building (the legislation
expands the bases on which unsuitability may rest), (iii) has a
structure on it that has been condemned by the local building of-
ficial, (iv) has been declared a nuisance by the locality, (v) con-
tains a derelict building, or (vi) has been declared to be blighted
by the locality.75 For sales of unimproved property valued at less
than $5000, none of the above requirements need be met in order
to proceed with the sale, provided that the taxes are delinquent
for more than three years.76
The legislature made additional amendments to Virginia Code
section 58.1-3975, concerning notice requirements for nonjudicial
71. Id. § 58.1-3854(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
72. Ch. 27, 2017 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 58.1-
3245.12, -3854(E)-(F) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
73. Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 437, 2017 Va. Acts , - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-3975(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3975(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 58.1-3975(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017). Under prior law, unimproved property valued
at less than $10,000 was subject to a nonjudicial sale provided the taxes were delinquent
for more than three years, regardless of whether the above requirements were met.
Id. § 58.1-3975(A) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
912017] TAXATION
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
sales and payment of attorney's fees for a redemption by owner in
lieu of pro rata costs of publication and mailing.77 The legislation
also specifies that the nonjudicial sale will be made subject to all
prior recorded liens, except the locality's tax lien, unless the local-
ity's treasurer gives the lienholder written notice of the sale at
least thirty days prior to the sale.7 8 Any excess proceeds would be
property of the prior owner, subject to claims of creditors, and the
evaluation of claims for such excess proceeds would be handled by
the circuit court.79
c. Constitutional Amendment for Property Tax Exemptions for
Certain Surviving Spouses
On November 8, 2016, Virginia voters ratified an amendment
to article X of the Virginia Constitution allowing localities to en-
act an ordinance "exempt[ing] from taxation the real property of
the surviving spouse of any law-enforcement officer, firefighter,
search and rescue personnel, or emergency medical services per-
sonnel who was killed in the line of duty, who occupies the real
property as his or her principal place of residence."80 The legisla-
ture subsequently amended Virginia Code sections 58.1-3219.13
through 58.1-3219.16 to provide the necessary statutory authori-
zation for localities to implement the new property tax exemp-
tion.81
d. Food and Beverage Tax Referendum Limitation
The legislature amended Virginia Code section 58.1-3833 to
impose a three-year moratorium on any referenda initiated by a
resolution of the Board of Supervisors to impose a local food and
beverage tax once the voters of a county fail to approve the levy of
the tax in a referendum.82 This legislation also requires any ref-
erendum held for the purposes of approving a food and beverage
tax to contain language specifying the total percentage of all tax-
77. Ch. 437, 2017 Va. Acts _, _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 58.1-
3975(D), (G) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3975(H) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
79. Id. § 58.1-395(J) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
80. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6-B.
81. Act of Feb. 24, 2017, ch. 248, 2017 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3219.13, -3219.14, -3219.15, -3219.16 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
82. Act of Apr. 26, 2017, ch. 833, 2017 Va. Acts _, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-3833(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
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es to be assessed on meals including the proposed maximum four
percent food and beverage tax.83 Under current law, a county is
authorized to levy a tax on food and beverages sold for human
consumption by a restaurant at a maximum rate of four percent
of the amount charged for such food and beverages.84 Generally,
in order for a county to impose the tax, the tax must be approved
in a referendum within the county.85
B. Significant Judicial Decisions
1. Real Property
a. Miller & Rhoads Building, L.L.C. v. City of Richmond
The issue presented in this real estate and special district tax
case is whether the City of Richmond's Tax Abatement for Reha-
bilitated Real Estate Program (the "Partial Exemption") applies
to special district taxes.86 On March 17, 2006, Miller & Rhoads
Building, L.L.C. ("MRB") acquired Miller & Rhoads Building (the
"Building"), which had been vacant.87 The Building was located in
a special service and assessment district of the City of Rich-
mond.88 The Building was subject to the city-wide real estate tax
and an annual special district tax.8 9 "Both taxes [were] calculated
as a percentage of the property's 'assessed evaluation.'90
MRB planned to rehabilitate the building and develop the
property, as well as recoupe some of the costs of rehabilitation by
seeking a Partial Exemption from real estate taxes for the prop-
erty under the City's Tax Abatement for Rehabilitated Real Es-
tate Program.91 The City determined the Partial Exemption ap-
plied to the base real estate tax, but refused to apply the Partial
Exemption to the special district tax.92 MRB challenged the City's
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3833(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Miller & Rhoads Bldg., L.L.C. v. City of Richmond, 292 Va. 537, 539-40, 790
S.E.2d 484, 485 (2016).
87. Id. at 540, 790 S.E.2d at 485.
88. Id. at 540, 790 S.E.2d at 485.
89. Id. at 540, 790 S.E.2d at 485.
90. Id. at 540, 790 S.E.2d at 485.
91. Id. at 540, 790 S.E.2d at 485.
92. Id. at 540, 790 S.E.2d at 485.
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determination that the Partial Exemption did not apply to the
special district tax.93 At trial, the circuit court upheld the City's
position and stated that, "according to the statutory origin for the
imposition of the Special District Tax, its beginning method of
calculation and its purposes, and use, [the Special District T]ax is
not a real estate tax within the meaning and for the use of the
[Partial Exemption]."
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, MRB argued "that
the trial court erred in ruling that the special district tax 'is not a
real estate tax within the meaning and for the use of' the Partial
Exemption."95 The City of Richmond conceded that the special
district tax is a real estate tax, but argued the special district tax
is a different type of real estate tax that is not subject to the Par-
tial Exemption.96 The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the
City.9 7 The Court stated that proper consideration should be giv-
en to the overarching statutory scheme, provided by Richmond
City Code section 98-816, not just the Partial Exemption and the
special district tax.98 Richmond City Code section 98-816 provides
that "[a]ll assessments levied under [Article XIV] shall be . . . sub-
ject to the following sections of Chapter 98 governing the levy and
collection of real estate taxes . . . [under] sections 98-123, 98-124,
98-127 and 98-129."99
The supreme court noted that the special district tax is not in-
cluded within those four enumerated sections, thus signifying
that the City did not intend for special district taxes levied under
article XIV to be "subject to" those omitted sections, noting the
Partial Exemption is contained in the omitted sections.100 Accord-
ingly, in a 4-3 decision, the court upheld the trial court's decision
that the special district tax is not subject to the Partial Exemp-
tion, albeit the finding was based on "the wrong reason, in ruling
93. Id. at 540, 790 S.E.2d at 485.
94. Id. at 541, 790 S.E.2d at 486 (alterations in original) (quoting Miller & Rhoads
Bldg., L.L.C. v. City of Richmond, No. 151701, 2016 Va. LEXIS 30, at *1 (Feb. 19, 2016)).
95. Id. at 541, 790 S.E.2d at 486.
96. Id. at 541, 790 S.E.2d at 486.
97. Id. at 541, 790 S.E.2d at 486.
98. Id. at 543, 790 S.E.2d at 487.
99. Id. at 543, 790 S.E.2d at 487 (original alterations omitted) (quoting CITY OF
RIcHmoND, VA., CODE § 98-816 (2004)).
100. Id. at 545, 790 S.E.2d at 488.
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that the special district tax 'is not a real estate tax within the
meaning and for the use of the [Partial Exemption]. "'101
Justice Kelsey wrote a strong and well-reasoned dissent that
was joined by Chief Justice Lemons and Justice McClanahan.102
The dissent argued that the majority should look at the meaning
of what the legislature enacted, as opposed to what the legisla-
ture intended to enact.103 The dissenting opinion argued that the
special district tax applies to real estate and that is what the leg-
islation accomplishes through its written statute. Justice Kelsey
elaborated, "The controlling text is unambiguous: The [P]artial
[E]xemption applies to 'Real Estate Taxation,"' citing City Code
chapter 98, article XIV, division 2.1.104 The dissent further stated
that "[b]y its plain terms, the [P]artial [E]xemption applies to real
estate taxes"10 and that the special district tax is a real estate
tax. Accordingly, the dissenting justices believe the partial ex-
emption should apply to the special district tax.106
b. PHF II Norfolk, LLC v. City of Norfolk
The Norfolk Waterside Sheraton Hotel ("PHF") challenged the
City of Norfolk's real estate tax assessments for tax years 2011
through 2014.107 What makes this circuit court case interesting is
that the tax years at issue straddle a legislative amendment to
Virginia Code section 58.1-3984(B) made by the Virginia General
Assembly in 2011, effective for the 2012, 2013, and 2014 tax
years, which are at issue in this case. The burden imposed on the
taxpayer under Virginia Code section 58.1-3984(B) prior to the
2011 legislative change required a taxpayer to prove that the City
committed "manifest error," which can be demonstrated by estab-
lishing a significant disparity between the City's assessed value
of the hotel and the proven fair market value of the hotel.108 For
the 2011 tax year, PHF only had to establish fair market value of
101. Id. at 545, 790 S.E.2d at 488 (alterations in original) (quoting Miller & Rhoads
Bldg., L.L.C., 2016 Va. LEXIS 30, at *1).
102. Id. at 545, 790 S.E.2d at 488 (Kelsey, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 548, 790 S.E.2d at 489-90.
104. Id. at 549, 790 S.E.2d at 490.
105. Id. at 554, 790 S.E.2d at 493.
106. Id. at 554, 790 S.E.2d at 493.
107. PHF II Norfolk, LLC v. City of Norfolk, 94 Va. Cir. 454, 454 (2016) (City of Nor-
folk).
108. Id. at 461.
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'the hotel and show that the hotel property was assessed at a
higher value than its fair market value, that the assessment was
not uniform in its application, or that the assessment is otherwise
invalid or illegal.109
The burden imposed on taxpayers challenging their real estate
assessments changed on January 1, 2012, when Virginia Code
section 58.1-3984(B) supplanted the former rule with the follow-
ing new rule:
In circuit court proceedings to seek relief from real property taxes,
there shall be a presumption that the valuation determined by the
assessor or as adjusted by the board of equalization is correct. The
burden of proof shall be on the taxpayer to rebut such presumption
and show by a preponderance of the evidence that the property in
question is valued at more than its fair market value or that the as-
sessment is not uniform in its application, and that it was not ar-
rived at in accordance with generally accepted appraisal practices,
procedures, rules, and standards as prescribed by nationally recog-
nized professional appraisal organizations such as the International
Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO) and applicable Virginia law
ifelating to valuation of property. Mistakes of fact, including compu-
tation, that affect the assessment shall be deemed not to be in ac-
cordance with generally accepted appraisal practice.110
Relying upon Virginia Code section 58.1-3984(B), the trial court
stated that in order to successfully challenge a tax assessment,
PHF must:
(1) establish a [fair market value] for the [p]roperty; (2) prove any
one of the following: (i) the City's assessment is not entitled to a pre-
sumption of correctness-in which case PHF must merely prove er-
ror on the City's part; (ii) the assessed value exceeds [fair market
value] because the City committed manifest error or totally disre-
garded controlling evidence; or (iii) the assessed value has not been
calculated in a manner uniform with similar properties; and (3) as of
tax year 2012, prove that the City did not comply with [generally ac-
cepted appraisal practice] when calculating the assessment.111
With respect to the tax year 2011, the trial court concluded
that PHF produced a reasonable estimate of the hotel property's
fair market value that complies with the dictates of Virginia
law. 112 The City challenged PHF's expert real estate appraiser's
109. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3984(B) (Cum. Supp. 2011).
110. PHF II Norfolk, LLC, 94 Va. Cir. at 460 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3984(B)
(2012)).
111. Id.at461-62.
112. Id. at 465.
[Vol. 52:7998
cost of a presumed Property Improvement Plan, which he deduct-
ed as part of his discounted cash flow methodology to reach an
opinion of value for the hotel.113 The trial court, however, found
PHF's appraiser to be very experienced and knowledgeable in the
field of hotel appraisal, supported by the fact that the appraiser
had authored a thorough report on valuations calculated and
generally provided credible testimony.114 The court did not find
the City's arguments that PHF's expert was overly speculative on
income estimates used in his discounted cash flow method per-
suasive. The court did question certain aspects of the PHF ex-
pert's methodology, but generally found his estimates of value
credible, although the court did not adopt the PHF expert's fair
market value as its own.115
For tax years 2012, 2013, and 2014, however, the trial court
held PHF failed to prove the City committed manifest error in as-
sessing the hotel property.1 16 "The Court [was] satisfied that the
City's uniform use of two-year-old financial data when calculating
assessments [was] appropriate."117 Further, the trial court stated,
"the City is not required to physically inspect properties being as-
sessed."11 8 The court also determined "that PHF failed to prove
that there [was] a significant disparity between the [p]roperty's
assessed values and [fair market values] that falls outside the
range of a reasonable difference of opinion."119 The court also held
that PHF failed to prove the City's assessments of the property
were non-uniform with similar properties, and that PHF did not
prove that the City's assessments for 2012-2014 did not comply
with generally accepted appraisal practice.120 Accordingly, PHF
prevailed on tax year 2011, under the former version of Virginia
Code section 58.1-3984(B), but failed to meet its burden of proof
for the later three tax years at issue (2012-2014).121
113. Id. at 464.
114. Id. at 465.
115. Id. at 465, 470.
116. Id. at 471-72.
117. Id. at 471.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 475.
120. Id. at 479, 484.
121. Id. at 484.
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2. Business Professional Occupation and License Tax
a. Verizon Online LLC v. Horbal
The decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia in Verizon
Online LLC v. Horbal22 is a significant decision which estab-
lished several key procedural points all practitioners should un-
derstand before initiating any administrative appeal of a local
business tax to the State Tax Co"n"rissioner, pursuant to Virginia
Code section 58.1-3983.1. Before discussing these procedural is-
sues, the substantive tax issue involved is whether Verizon
Online's ("Verizon") television set top boxes, also known as "con-
verters" and used in its TV business, are intangible personal
property not subject to local taxation by virtue of Virginia Code
section 58.1-1101(A)(2a) or whether the set top boxes are ma-
chines and subject to tax by localities under Virginia Code section
58.1-3057(B).123
For tax years 2008, 2009, and 2010, Chesterfield County Com-
missioner of the Revenue, Joseph Horbal, assessed local property
machinery and tools tax on Verizon's television set top boxes.124
Verizon paid the tax and initiated a local appeal of the 2008-2010
taxes assessed and paid, seeking a refund of $1,003,657.125 Veri-
zon brought its appeal under Virginia Code section 58.1-
3983.1(B), providing for appeal to the local commissioner of reve-
nue from local business tax assessment, and section 58.1-3980(A),
providing for application to local commissioner of revenue for cor-
rection of local tax assessment.126 Verizon argued in support of its
refund claim that the television set top boxes were intangible per-
sonal property used in a cable television business and such assets
are segregated for state taxation only.127 Virginia does not impose
a tax on intangible personal property, so Verizon sought a full re-
fund of the taxes collected by Chesterfield County on the televi-
sion set top boxes.128 Commissioner Horbal denied the tax refund
122. 293 Va. 176, 796 S.E.2d 409 (2017).
123. Id. at 179-80, 796 S.E.2d at 410-11.
124. Id. at 180, 796 S.E.2d at 411.
125. Id. at 180, 796 S.E.2d at 411.
126. Id. at 180 & n.2, 796 S.E.2d at 411 & n.2.
127. Id. at 180, 796 S.E.2d at 411; see VA. CODE. ANN. § 58.1-1100 (Repl. Vol. 2017)
(stating that intangible personal property is segregated for state taxation only).
128. Verizon Online LLC, 293 Va. at 181, 796 S.E.2d at 411.
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claim, stating that the set top boxes were ''machinery," thus sub-
ject to tax by Chesterfield County.12 9
Verizon appealed Commissioner Horbal's determination to the
State Tax Commissioner pursuant to Virginia Code section 58.1-
3983.1(D).130 This statute provides for an appeal to the State Tax
Commissioner by any person whose administrative appeal to the
local commissioner of the revenue has been denied.131 The State
Tax Commissioner reversed the local Commissioner's decision
and held that the television set top boxes were "classified as 'in-
tangible personal property' under Code § 58.1-1101(A)(1)(2a) and,
thus, not taxable by the County."132 The State Tax Commissioner
directed Chesterfield County to issue refunds to Verizon for the
local taxes it paid for tax years 2008, 2009, and 2010 on set top
boxes it owned.133
Chesterfield County initiated a judicial review of the State Tax
Commissioner's determination in circuit court, pursuant to Vir-
ginia Code sections 58.1-3983.1(G) and 58.1-3984.134 The County
renewed the arguments it raised in defending its local determina-
tion before Verizon's administrative appeal to the State Tax
Commissioner on the substantive tax issue relating to the televi-
sion set top boxes.35 Chesterfield Commissioner Horbal, however,
raised a new issue in the judicial proceeding he had not raised
during Verizon's administrative appeal to the Commonwealth.
Horbal alleged that Verizon's appeal to the State Tax Commis-
sioner for tax years 2008 and 2009 was untimely, and the State
Tax Commissioner was without Jurisdiction to order refunds for
those years.136
The circuit court held that Verizon's television set top boxes
were not machines subject to local taxation, but were intangible
personal property within the meaning of Virginia Code section
58.1-1101(A)(2a), thus sustaining the State Tax Commissioner's
determination on this issue.137 However, the trial court also held
129. Id. at 180, 796 S.E.2d at 411.
130. Id. at 181, 796 S.E.2d at 411.
131. Id. at 181 & n.4, 796 S.E.2d at 411 & n.4.
132. Id. at 181, 796 S.E.2d at 411.
133. Id. at 181, 796 S.E.2d at 411.
134. Id. at 181, 796 S.E.2d at 411.
135. See id. at 181, 796 S.E.2d at 411.
136. Id. at 185-86, 796 S.E.2d at 414.
137. See id. at 181, 796 S.E.2d at 411-12.
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that Verizon was not entitled to a refund for tax years 2008 and
2009 because its appeal to Commissioner Horbal was untimely
and the State Tax Commissioner was without jurisdiction to or-
der refunds for those two years.138 At trial, Commissioner Horbal
contended that "Verizon failed to file its local appeal of the as-
sessments for [2008 and 2009] within one year from the last day
of the tax year for which the assessments were made or within
one year from the date of the assessments as required by Code §
58.1-3983.1(B)(1)."139 The trial court agreed.140
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Verizon argued
that Commissioner Horbal waived his right to challenge the State
Tax Commissioner's jurisdiction when he consented to the State
Tax Commissioner considering and ruling on the merits on Veri-
zon's appeal for each of the tax years at issue, and he failed to
raise any jurisdictional objection to the State Tax Commission-
er.141 Verizon argued that in order to raise and preserve the issue
for judicial review, Horbal needed to dispute the State Tax Com-
missioner's jurisdiction to the Tax Commissioner himself pursu-
ant to Virginia Code section 58.1-3983.1(D)(3), just as a litigant in
a non-tax case would be required to raise before the circuit court
any objections he has to the circuit court.142 On brief, Verizon ar-
gued that the circuit court sits as a court of appeals for State Tax
Commissioner determinations, reviewing decisions for error.143
Continuing on, Verizon asserted that "failure to raise an argu-
ment in the administrative phase is as fatal to a litigant as the
failure to raise a trial issue in the Circuit Court prior to appeal to
the Supreme Court."144 Verizon further asserted that Horbal's re-
sponse to Verizon's administrative appeal to the State Tax Com-
missioner contained no challenge to the Tax Commissioner's ju-
risdiction to resolve the parties' dispute and contained no
mention of any jurisdictional concern.145
138. Id. at 186, 796 S.E.2d at 414.
139. Id. at 185-86, 796 S.E.2d at 414.
140. See id. at 186, 796 S.E.2d at 414.
141. Id. at 186, 796 S.E.2d at 414.
142. See id. at 186-87, 796 S.E.2d at 414-15.
143. See Brief for Appellant at 13, Verizon Online LLC v. Horbal, 293 Va. 176, 796
S.E.2d 409 (2017) (No. 15-1955); see also Verizon Online LLC, 293 Va. at 186, 796 S.E.2d
at 414.
144. Brief for Appellant at 10, Verizon Online LLC v. Horbal, 293 Va. 176, 796 S.E.2d
409 (2017) (No. 15-1955).
145. Id. at 12.
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Commissioner Horbal argued that "the time period for filing a
local appeal provided for in Code § 58.1-3983.1(B) is a matter of
subject matter jurisdiction that may be raised at any time."14 6
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed.147 The court concluded
that "the time period for filing a local appeal provided for in code
§ 58.1-3983.1(B) is 'an other [sic] jurisdictional element subject to
waiver if not properly raised."'148 Accordingly, the issue regarding
the timelines of Verizon's local appeal under code section 58.1-
3983.1(B) was not preserved for review by the circuit court and
the circuit court erred in ruling that Verizon was not entitled to
refunds of the taxes paid for tax years 2008 and 2009.149 The
court held and affirmed the circuit court's determination of the
State Tax Commissioner and ruled that Verizon's set top boxes
were not subject to local taxation.150 The court reversed the part
of the circuit court's judgment that reversed the determination of
the State Tax Commissioner and ruled that Verizon was not enti-
tled to refunds of taxes paid for 2008 and 2009, and entered
judgment in favor of Verizon on that issue.15'
The Verizon Online LLC decision as to the issue on how courts
should review the unique administrative appeal process con-
tained in Virginia Code section 58.1-3983.1 comes as a surprise to
most Virginia tax practitioners. Under Code section 58.1-
3983.1(G), which provides for judicial review of the State Tax
Commissioner's determination by the circuit court, the party
challenging the determination must show that the ruling of the
State Tax Commissioner is "erroneous with respect to the part
challenged."152 After referencing this statute, the Supreme Court
of Virginia went on to state, "in such proceedings, the circuit
court acts in the role of an appellate court."153 The Supreme Court
of Virginia cites two non-tax cases as support for this proposition,
but from analogous situations, which lend support to the state-
ment.154 The two cases involved a review of agency actions or de-
cisions, both of which involved agencies whose decisions wpre
146. Verizon Online LLC, 293 Va. at 188, 796 S.E.2d at 415.
147. Id. at 188, 796 S.E.2d at 415.
148. Id. at 188, 796 S.E.2d at 415.
149. Id. at 189, 796 S.E.2d at 415-16.
150. Id. at 189, 796 S.E.2d at 416.
151. Id. at 189, 796 S.E.2d at 416.
152. VA. CODE. ANN. § 58.1-3983.1(G) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
153. Verizon Online LLC, 293 Va. at 186, 796 S.E.2d at 414.
154. See id. at 186, 796 S.E.2d at 414.
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subject to the Virginia Administrative Procedures Act
("VAPA"). 155 The Court also looked at the roles of Supreme Court
Rules 5:25 and 5A:18 in connection to appeals from agency deci-
sions under the VAPA and principles of procedural default.156
Rules 5:25 and 5A:18 require preservation of issues for appellate
review by the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia, respectively.1 57 The supreme court seems to
suggest that such principles similar to these rules apply to de-
terminations of the State Tax Commissioner when judicially chal-
lenged under code section 58.1-3983.1(G) before the trial court.
Neither of the two cases cited in support of the court's position
involve the administrative appeal rules set out in Virginia Code
section 58.1-3983.1 applicable to appeals of local tax final deter-
minations or of any other State Tax Department agency deci-
sions, for that matter. Yet the court, under the introductory sig-
nal "Cf.," cited two Court of Appeals of Virginia decisions where
the appellate court in each case reviewed agency decisions that
were subject to the VAPA.15s
A number of stakeholders participated in developing the local
business tax appeal statute during the late 1990s which led to the
General Assembly adopting the new administrative appeals and
rulings provisions contained in Virginia Code section 58.1-
3983.1.159 At no time during the development of the local tax ap-
peal statue was it contemplated that determinations made by the
State Tax Commissioner on appeals of final determinations by lo-
cal taxing jurisdictions would be either subject to the VAPA or
have administrative appeals treated in a similar manner as agen-
cy decisions on claims which are subject to the VAPA. Historical-
ly, with the exception of occasionally promulgating tax regula-
tions from time to time, no decision or ruling of the Virginia
155. Id. at 186-87, 796 S.E.2d at 414 (citing French v. Va. Marine Res. Comm'n, 64 Va.
App. 226, 236, 767 S.E.2d 245, 251 (2015); Pence Holdings, Inc. v. Auto Ctr., Inc., 19 Va.
App. 703, 707-08, 454 S.E.2d 732, 734-35 (1995)).
156. Id. at 187, 796 S.E.2d at 414-15; see VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:25, 5A:18 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
157. R. 5:25, 5A:18 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
158. See Verizon Online LLC, 293 Va. at 186-87, 796 S.E.2d at 414 (citing French, 64
Va. App. 226, 236, 767 S.E.2d 245, 251; Pence Holdings, Inc., 19 Va. App. 703, 707-08, 454
S.E.2d 732, 734-35).
159. The author was a participant in the advisory group that drafted and proposed to
the General Assembly a bill establishing the new local business tax rules contained within




Department of Taxation is subject to the VAPA.o60 Accordingly,
comparing the administrative tax appeal procedures to court
challenges to agency decisions that are subject to the VAPA pur-
ports to create similarities where none exist.
Taxpayer appeals of final determinations by local tax jurisdic-
tions to the State Tax Commissioner are designed to give the tax-
payer a cost efficient review of a local tax assessment without the
need to initiate a judicial challenge to the tax assessment. How-
ever, in an administrative appeal of a local business tax to the
State Tax Department, the taxpayer does not receive many of the
rights that would be available if the VAPA applied to an adminis-
trative appeal. In administrative tax appeals, the taxpayer has no
right to an actual face-to-face due process hearing, to call wit-
nesses, or to subpoena local tax officials and question them on
their final tax determination.161 In fact, the entire administrative
"proceeding" is handled by submitting a written appeal, followed
by the written submission by the local taxing jurisdiction to ad-
dress any points made by the taxpayer in its written appeal.162
Nothing further is contemplated in the administrative appeal
process. The entire administrative appeal program is designed to
be informal and provide an opportunity to the taxpayer to avoid
the cost of litigation.
However, if the circuit court is called upon to review an admin-
istrative decision by the State Tax Commissioner as if it is an ap-
pellate court, then the rules of the game have changed. For ex-
ample, if the issue in a business professional and occupational
license ("BPOL") tax assessment involves whether the taxpayer
has a definite place of business in the locality, may the taxpayer
then raise any factual or legal argument it wants in circuit court
in support of the position taken in the administrative appeal to
the State Tax Department that it had no definite place of busi-
ness in the locality? What if the taxpayer, a manufacturer, argues
in the administrative appeal that it is not taxable because it has
no definite place of business in the locality? If the taxpayer loses,
may it then argue in the circuit court that if it is taxable at all, it
is because it is a wholesale merchant, to which an exclusion from
tax applies, and not a retail merchant subject to the BPOL tax?
160. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-203(B)-(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
161. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3703.1(A)(6), -3983.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
162. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3703.1(A)(6), -3983.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 2017); cf. VA.
ADMIN. CODE § 10-20-170 (2008) (repealed 2009).
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Is the taxpayer bound to the administrative record when seek-
ing to challenge the local tax assessment following an administra-
tive appeal? For example, using the same example of a taxpayer
who is a manufacturer, if the State Tax Commissioner rules that
the taxpayer is a manufacturer, but is not selling at wholesale at
the place of manufacture, is the only issue you need to prove at
trial that you are selling at wholesale if the locality does not cross
appeal?
Virginia tax practitioners and the State Tax Department have
always operated under the presumption that the Tax Depart-
ment's actions, except for promulgating regulations, are not cov-
ered by the VAPA. Under Virginia Code section 2.2-4018(1), "[t]he
assessment of taxes or penalties and other rulings in individual
cases in connection with the administration of the tax laws" are
specifically exempt from the article governing case decisions in
the VAPA. 163 This statutory provision includes both informal fact
finding proceedings, as well as formal proceedings for the taking
of evidence and testimony.164 The Supreme Court of Virginia's
choice to compare a local tax appeal to a matter specifically gov-
erned by the VAPA and apply VAPA principles governing case
decisions, as it did in the Verizon Online LLC decision, is most
troubling in light of the statutory exemption afforded by Virginia
Code section 2.2-4018(1) and creates uncertainty where none
should exist with regard to administrative local tax appeals.
b. Dulles Duty Free, LLC v. County of Loudoun
This case is about whether the County of Loudoun violates the
United States Constitution when it taxes the gross receipts real-
ized by Dulles Duty Free, LLC ("Duty Free") on its export sales.166
Duty Free is a duty-free retailer.166 "Duty Free sells alcohol, to-
bacco, luxury gifts, fragrances and other goods in their stores."167
During tax years 2009 to 2011, Duty Free operated five stores
163. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4018(1) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
164. See id.
165. Dulles Duty Free, LLC v. County of Loudoun, Civil No. 90613, letter op. at 1 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Apr. 26, 2016) (Loudoun County) (unpublished decision) (on file with the authors).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2.
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at the Dulles International Airport in Loudoun County. 168 A sixth
store was opened in 2012, and it operated for the years 2012 and
2013.169 The specific facts were as follows:
Duty Free assembles imported and domestic goods in bonded
warehouses in Florida and Texas. Bonded carriers transport the
goods to a bonded warehouse at Dulles Airport where they are even-
tually delivered to the retail stores within the airport. This process is
highly regulated, scrutinized and controlled. For example, a bonded
carrier arriving at the airport warehouse is unable to unload his
sealed container until a customs official is present to verify the de-
livery, and to break the customs seal and cut the bolts sealing the
container. Once in the warehouse, items are first delivered to a stag-
ing area where they must again be inspected before they can be
warehoused. The process of delivery to the retail stores is also highly
controlled.
Once in the retail stores the goods are available for sale in the
"sterile" area of the airport. This is the area where only passengers
who have boarding passes and have gone through security may en-
ter. Both domestic and international passengers may make purchas-
es at Duty Free's stores. The evidence showed that Duty Free is able
to identify whether a sale is for import or export. If a domestic pas-
senger purchases an item, a Virginia sales tax is charged and the
customer is able to take possession of the item. If the sale involves a
bonded imported item, an import duty is paid by the domestic pas-
senger.
International sales are handled differently. An international trav-
eler must show his or her passport and boarding pass, which is veri-
fied by Duty Free's cashier. The international traveler purchases the
goods for export. No Virginia sales tax is collected nor is any duty
collected. The merchandise is not delivered to the traveler at the
point of sale. The traveler obtains a receipt and a duty free cartman
meets the traveler at the jet way just prior to boarding the plane,
where the traveler surrenders his receipt to the cartman in exchange
for the goods. In this way, Duty Free ensures that items are in fact
for export. These procedures are to ensure actual export. . . . Duty
Free is able to demonstrate through record keeping the percentage of
sales attributable to domestic travelers and international travelers.
... Duty Free does not challenge the BPOL taxes attributable to its
domestic sales.170
However, Duty Free argued that the BPOL tax which arose
from gross receipts attributable to their international sales (de-
168. Id. at 1.
169. Id. at 1-2.
170. Id.
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pending on the tax year the amount of export sales varies be-
tween ninety-two and ninety-nine percent of its total sales) vio-
lated the United States Constitution.171
At trial, Duty Free argued that, as applied to its export sales,
the Loudoun County BPOL tax based on gross receipts violates
the Import-Export Clause of the United States Constitution.1 7 2
The Import-Export Clause states, "No State shall, without the
Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or
Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
it's [sic] inspection Laws . . . ."173 Duty Free argued that under the
Import-Export Clause, Loudoun County's "BPOL tax based on
gross receipts is imposed on sales of exports, and therefore quali-
fies as a 'direct' tax on the goods sold."174 The BPOL tax is meas-
ured by the amount of sales.75 Further, "Duty Free maintain[ed]
that the export,goods being sold and delivered to those preparing
imminently to go abroad [were] 'in export transit' and cannot be
taxed."76
Loudoun County countered by arguing that its "BPOL tax is
not a sales, property, or income tax."'77 In fact, the BPOL tax is
not on a particular transaction, but only uses sales as the meas-
ure of business activity upon which to base its tax.178 Accordingly,
the BPOL tax is only "an 'indirect' tax for the privilege to engage
in a business in Loudoun County."179 The trial court held that Du-
ty Free met its burden of proof and established its export sales
were in transit for export.180
However, under the Import-Export Clause, Duty Free still had
to prove that the Loudoun County BPOL tax was a direct tax on
exports. Duty Free relied principally on the Supreme Court of the
United States decision in Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of
171. Id. See Transcript of Record at 10, 255-58, 271-87, 457, Dulles Duty Free, LLC v.
County of Loudoun, Civil No. 90613, letter op. at 1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 26, 2016) (Loudoun
County) (unpublished decision) (on file with the authors).
172. Id. at 3.
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
174. Dulles Duty Free, LLC, letter op. at 3.
175. See id. at 3-4.
176. Id. at 3.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 3-4.
179. Id. at 3.
180. See id. at 12.
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Equalization.181 In Richfield Oil Corp., the Supreme Court of the
United States held that, as applied to Richfield, a California priv-
ilege tax measured by the "gross receipts" from all of Richfield's
oil sales to New Zealand violated the Import-Export Clause.18 2
The Supreme Court held the California tax assessments based on
the value or sale price of the goods, for federal protected constitu-
tional rights purposes, is a tax on the goods themselves.18 3 Duty
Free argued that the County's BPOL tax, also for the privilege to
engage in business and measured by gross receipts, is structured
in the same manner as the California tax struck down by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in Richfield.184
Loudoun County argued the Richfield Oil Corp. decision was no
longer good law, even though the Supreme Court of the United
States had not reversed Richfield.85 Rather, the County argued
two more recent decisions by the Supreme Court that involved
the Import-Export Clause, provided a policy oriented test, and
that this test represented the current state of instructive law. 86
The two more recent decisions, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages87
and Department of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Wash-
ington Stevedoring Companies,'8 adopted a three-part, policy ori-
ented test to determine if a state or local tax impermissibly vio-
lated the Import-Export Clause.189 Following a lengthy discussion
of the Michelin Tire Corp. and Washington Stevedoring opinions,
the trial court was persuaded that Loudoun County's BPOL tax
was neither an impost nor a duty upon exports, but rather an
"indirect tax" that did not "fall" upon the export.o90 Accordingly,
the trial court denied Duty Free's application for a refund of
BPOL taxes paid on its export sales.19
Duty Free filed a Petition for Appeal with the Supreme Court
of Virginia, which was granted by the court on December 14,
181. Id. at 6 (citing Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946)).
182. See Richfield Oil Corp., 329 U.S. at 71, 83, 86.
183. See id. at 71-72, 84-86.
184. Dulles Duty Free, LLC, letter op. at 7.
185. See id. at 9.
186. See id. at 7-8.
187. 423 U.S. 276 (1976). This case did not involve an export in transit. See id. at 302.
188. 435 U.S. 734 (1978). This case did not present a tax on a good in transit but rather
a tax on ancillary labor services to move a good in transit. See id. at 736-38.
189. Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 285-86; Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 762.
190. Dulles Duty Free, LLC, letter op. at 13.
191. See id.
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2016.192 Briefing to the court on the appeal was completed on
February 24, 2017, and oral argument was presented in June of
2017.193 A decision by the Supreme Court of Virginia is expected
in the fall of 2017.
3. Machinery and Tools Tax
a. Western Refining Yorktown, Inc. v. County of York
A divided Supreme Court of Virginia upheld machinery and
tools tax assessments by the County of York Commissioner of the
Revenue for tax years 2010 and 2011.194 Western Refining York-
town, Inc. ("Western Refining") challenged the County of York's
tax assessments of its machinery and tools ("M&T") for the 2010
and 2011 tax years and asserted that the York County Commis-
sioner of the Revenue ignored the appraisal report prepared by its
expert that opined on the value of its M&T. 195
The refinery at issue in the case was completed in 1956.196
Western Refining acquired the facility in 2006.197 The refinery oc-
cupied approximately 658 acres.198 Upon acquisition, Western Re-
fining invested heavily to upgrade the facility, making purchases
of approximately $213,500,000 in equipment to comply with envi-
ronmental mandates, but also to improve the refinery's profitabil-
ity.199 By 2010, Western Refining's York County facility was oper-
ating at a loss. 2 0 0 In September 2010, Western Refining shutdown
the facility, idled the M&T, and laid off almost its entire work-
force.201 In March 2011, Western Refining "filed a 10-K statement
with the Securities & Exchange Commission [("SEC")] indicating
to investors that its refining assets were worth $472,000,000, and
192. Dulles Duty Free, LLC v. County of Loudoun, Record No. 160939, SUPREME COURT
OF VA.: APPELLATE CASE MGMT. SYS., https://eapps.courts.state.va.us/acms-public/caseln
quiry/showCasePublicInquiry.
193. Id.; June 2017 Argument Docket, VA.'S JUD. SYS., http://www.courts.state.va.us/cou
rts/scv/docket.html.
194. See W. Refining Yorktown, Inc. v. County of York, 292 Va. 804, 808, 810, 793
S.E.2d 777, 777-79 (2016).
195. See id. at 808, 810, 793 S.E.2d at 778-79.
196. Id. at 809, 793 S.E.2d at 779.
197. Id. at 809, 793 S.E.2d at 779.
198. Id. at 809, 793 S.E.2d at 779.
199. Id. at 809, 793 S.E.2d at 779.
200. Id. at 809, 793 S.E.2d at 779.
201. See id. at 809, 793 S.E.2d at 779.
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that it planned to let the facility sit idle to wait out the poor econ-
omy." 2 0 2 The SEC filing also stated that Western Refining
planned to restart the refinery no later than mid-2013; however,
the refinery was never restarted.203 In fact, Western Refining sold
its York County facility to Plains Marketing LP on December 29,
2011, for $180,000,000.204 Plains Marketing was not a refiner, but
rather a reseller of equipment, machinery, and tools. 20 5
York County assessed Western Refining's M&T at twenty-five
percent of its original cost.2 0 6 The York County Commissioner of
the Revenue uses the same methodology, twenty-five percent of
original cost, on M&T assessments regardless of the age of the
M&T. 2 0 7 Western Refining sought to lower its M&T assessments
by providing the Commissioner with an appraisal of its M&T lo-
cated at the York County facility. 208 Western Refining's initial
appraisal report valued the M&T at $25,000,000 for 2010 and
$16,000,000 for 2011.209 To reach these values for the M&T,
Western Refining's appraiser looked at the three methods of ap-
praising property: sales comparison, income, and cost.210 The
Western Refining appraiser valued the total plant site, including
the land.211 The appraiser "then deducted the value of component
parts, such as real estate and its improvements, tankage, pollu-
tion control assets, and what remained, [the expert] concluded,
was the value of the [M&T]."212
The Commissioner of the Revenue considered the Western Re-
fining's expert appraisal report and also its supporting sched-
ules.2 13 The Commissioner also "found that the site was subject to
credit line deeds of trust in the amounts of $800 million and $1.7
billion." 2 1 4 The Commissioner sought information as to whether
any of the M&T was pledged as collateral, but received no re-
202. Id. at 809, 793 S.E.2d at 779.
203. Id. at 809, 793 S.E.2d at 779.
204. Id. at 809, 793 S.E.2d at 779.
205. See id. at 809, 793 S.E.2d at 779.
206. Id. at 810, 793 S.E.2d at 779-80.
207. Id. at 810, 793 S.E.2d at 779-80.
208. See id. at 813, 793 S.E.2d at 781.
209. Id. at 813, 793 S.E.2d at 781.
210. Id. at 813, 793 S.E.2d at 781.
211. See id. at 813, 793 S.E.2d at 781.
212. Id. at 813, 793 S.E.2d at 781.
213. See id. at 812, 793 S.E.2d at 780.
214. Id. at 812, 793 S.E.2d at 780.
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sponse to her inquiry.215 The Commissioner refused to change her
M&T tax assessments and Western Refining initiated M&T liti-
gation pursuant to Virginia Code section 58.1-3984 to correct the
tax assessments.216
At trial, York County presented an expert o opine on the value
of the M&T, which he concluded to be approximately
$215,400,000 for 2010 and $198,000,000 for 2011.217 York Coun-
ty's expert also challenged the methodology used by Western Re-
fining's expert.218 The trial court found the commissioner's as-
sessments to be prima facie correct and rejected the testimony of
Western Refining's expert.219 Ultimately, the trial court held
Western Refining failed to meet its burden of proof to show the
M&T was valued in excess of its fair market value.220
On appeal, the same basic arguments were made by the par-
ties. Additionally, Western Refining argued that assessing all
M&T at twenty-five percent of its original cost is not a valid
method, as it "is not reasonably expected to determine fair mar-
ket value."2 2 1 The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed. The court
noted that Virginia Code sections 58.1-3503(B) and 58.1-3507(B)
require the commissioner to take into account the condition of the
property, and "must also consider 'upon written request of the
taxpayer . . . any bona fide, independent appraisal presented by
the taxpayer."'222 The court looked at the SEC filings made by
Western Refining, the sale of property in late 2011, as well as the
two appraisals.223 The court stated the Commissioner of the Rev-
enue did not ignore Western Refining's appraisal, but considered
it along with other information she developed.224 The Supreme
Court of Virginia also rejected Western Refining's contention that
the county assumed inconsistent positions in a related litigation
matter involving the real estate assessments.225 The result of its
215. Id. at 812, 793 S.E.2d at 780.
216. See id. at 812-13, 793 S.E.2d at 780-81.
217. Id. at 813, 793 S.E.2d at 781.
218. See id. at 814, 793 S.E.2d at 782.
219. Id. at 815, 793 S.E.2d at 782.
220. Id. at 815, 793 S.E.2d at 782.
221. Id. at 816, 793 S.E.2d at 783.
222. Id. at 817, 793 S.E.2d at 783 (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3503(B), -3507(B)
(Repl. Vol. 2013)) (emphasis in original).
223. Id. at 820, 793 S.E.2d at 785.
224. See id. at 821, 793 S.E.2d at 786.
225. See id. at 829, 793 S.E.2d at 790.
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analysis led four members of the court to uphold the trial court's
decision, including three judges on the primary opinion and one
judge concurring on the judgment reached in the primary opin-
ion.2
26
Three judges dissented on the basis that using twenty-five per-
cent of original cost of the M&T, without conducting any studies
or receipt of advice by consultants, was arbitrary.227 The dissent-
ers opined that the Commissioner exceeded her statutory authori-
ty under Virginia Code section 58.1-3503 by imposing arbitrary
assessments and that they would have reversed and remanded
the case back to the trial court.22 8
b. International Paper Company v. Isle of Wight County
Just two months after the Supreme Court of Virginia issued its
decision in Western Refining, the trial court in International Pa-
per Company v. County of Isle of Wight presided over an M&T tax
case involving a local government's use of a percentage of original
cost to arrive at what Isle of Wight County considered to repre-
sent the fair market value of M&T. Unlike the twenty-five per-
cent of original cost used in York County that barely survived the
Supreme Court of Virginia's review in Western Refining, Isle of
Wight County taxed M&T at 100% of original cost.2 2 9 Following a
six-day trial, the circuit court for the County of Isle of Wight
ruled that the County's methodology for taxing International Pa-
per Company's ("IP") M&T at their original total capitalized cost,
without allowance for depreciation, was clearly erroneous.230 The
trial court ordered substantial M&T tax refunds and interest for
tax years 2012-2014 that exceeded $4,000,000.231
Perhaps most interesting in this trial was a procedural issue
raised by the County. Isle of Wight County asserted that IP will-
fully refused to provide the County with accurate records and fil-
ings that prevented the County from providing accurate M&T tax
226. See id. at 829, 793 S.E.2d at 790.
227. Id. at 830, 793 S.E.2d at 790 (McClanahan, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 830, 833, 793 S.E.2d at 790, 792.
229. Int'l Paper Co. v. County of Isle of Wight, No. CL 14001026-00, slip op. at 1 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 2017) (Isle of Wight County).
230. Id.
231. See id. at 2-4.
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assessments.2 32 Specifically, the County asserted that IP admit-
ted, by virtue of filing amended M&T tax returns with the Coun-
ty, that it erroneously had reported some M&T on its original
M&T tax return that were either idled or were double-reported.233
The amended returns sought to eliminate the double reporting of
the M&T, along with eliminating the idled property that was re-
ported on the original M&T tax returns as in use.2 3 4 The County
also argued IP's reporting of its electric power plant to the State
Corporation Commission for assessment, as had been done in pri-
or years, was a willful attempt to refuse to furnish a local as-
sessing official with information,235 even though the actual tax
imposed and to be remitted to the County would be the same.2 36
Accordingly, the County argued that, under Virginia Code section
58.1-3987, IP's actions should prevent the taxpayer from receiv-
ing any refund of tax despite the success of IP's claims on the rest
of the refund claim.2 3 7
IP responded by pointing out that the County offered no allega-
tion as to how such actions support the claim of a willful failure to
provide all requisite and requested information.238 In fact, if any-
thing, IP's actions caused it to pay more M&T tax than required,
by virtue of its reporting some idled equipment and double re-
porting several items of M&T, cumulatively estimated at only
several percent of the total tax refund claims for these two tax
years.239 Under Virginia Code sections 58.1-3984 and 58.1-3987,
IP argued that "the mere failure to provide a perfect return by the
due date will not bar recovery, as the use of the qualifier 'willful'
232. Id. at 2; County of Isle of Wight's Demurrer and Plea in Bar ¶¶ 19-20, Int'l Paper
Co. v. County of Isle of Wight, No. CL 14001026-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 2017) (Isle of
Wight County) [hereinafter County's Demurrer].
233. County's Demurrer, supra note 232, ¶ 21.
234. Int'l Paper Co.'s Opposition to County's Demurrer and Plea in Bar at 5, Interna-
tional Paper Co. v. County of Isle of Wight, No. CL 14001026-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 15,
2017) (Isle of Wight County) [hereinafter IP's Opposition to Demurrer].
235. County's Demurrer, supra note 232, ¶¶ 24-25.
236. See id. ¶ 18-19 (stating that a willful refusal of the applicant to furnish necessary
information would result in the County keeping the erroneously paid taxes).
237. Id. IT 19-20.
238. IP's Opposition to Demurrer, supra note 234, at 5.
239. Id. at 3.
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'imports something more than the mere exercise of the will in do-
ing the act. It imports a wrongful intention."'
240
The trial court did rule that Virginia Code section 58.1-3987
"places the burden of proof on the County to establish that any
particular erroneous assessment was caused by the wilful [sic]
failure or refusal of IP to furnish the [County] Commissioner of
the Revenue with the necessary information, as required by
law."2 4 1 At the conclusion of the trial, the court held
[tihat the County failed, as a matter of law, to carry its burden to
show that its erroneous assessments of IP's [M&T] for tax years
2012, 2013, and 2014 were caused by IP's failure or refusal to fur-
nish the County any necessary information, or any information re-
quired by law.2 42
The court also held "the County failed, as a matter of law, to car-
ry its burden to show that any failure to promptly provide the
County complete and accurate information during tax years
[2012-2014] was willful." 24 3
240. Id. at 14-15 (quoting King v. Empire Collieries Co., 148 Va. 585, 590, 139 S.E.
478, 479 (1927)).
241. Order Regarding Burden of Proof Under Code § 58.1-3987 at 1, Int'l Paper Co. v.
County of Isle of Wight, No. CL 14001026-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 2017) (Isle of Wight
County).
242. Int? Paper Co., slip op. at 2.
243. Id.
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